It has been claimed that only in the decline of a civilization is its greatest philosophy born – of tragedy in the present and hopes for the future, the warp and woof of the most potent and enduring tapestries of thought humanity has yet produced. If this is necessarily so, then it would seem our current age is in no imminent jeopardy, despite any signs to the contrary – we seem unlikely to, any time soon, produce another Plato, or another Augustine. Another Jerry Lewis would seem the best we can hope for.
Facetiousness aside, it is of course no accident that these two philosophers should find themselves in company here – even a rudimentary familiarity with the two is enough to suggest a certain similarity, and further study makes the association that much clearer. In circumstance, certainly, and in theory, one can easily see the impact of Plato upon the works of Augustine; but it is impact only, not, as some have suggested, some form of ideological plagiarism. Indeed, such a suggestion discounts the benefits Augustine derived from varied other sources throughout his life, let alone his own great efforts in laying what was to become a foundation in thought for the coming age of the western world.
This paper, then, shall put forward the notion that Augustine draws upon knowledge of Plato, but departs on any number of points – some in relation or response to various philosophies or heresies with which he is familiar, and others of his own thought and unique purpose. To this end, we shall examine both the individuals of Augustine and Plato, drawing upon any number of their works where deemed appropriate, and especially upon Augustine's well-recognized magnum opus, De Civitate Dei (the City of God), in relation to Plato's Politeia (the Republic), with specific emphasis on the concept of justice as discussed by each.
On Circumstance and Intent
To begin, it is instructive to examine the circumstances of the writing of each of these great works, in more detail than that fitted to introductory paragraphs and throw-away jokes. It is, rather, a highly meaningful avenue of investigation, with bearing on the further matter of both the similarities and disparities between Plato and Augustine's thought on the matter at hand. To this end, then, let us begin with Plato.
Much of what we know of Plato's personal history is derived from his first-hand testimony, as recorded in a letter sent by him to mutual friends of his best-loved companion, excepting only Socrates – one Dion of Syracuse1. This letter, known as the Seventh Letter, sent to said friends after the death of Dion, contains in brief some details of Plato's political career, and the state in which he found the city as a young man. Moreover, based on the contents of this letter (amongst other historical proofs), one can place Plato's writings in history – and thus, place Plato himself2.
Plato was born a year after Pericles3, that great populist leader of Athens, died of the plague that ravaged the already siege-beleaguered city of Athens4. He grew up in the knowledge of defeat in the continuing disaster of the Peloponnesian wars, and a crumbling, disease-ridden empire. In his youth, revolution overturned the deservedly unpopular government, and he embarked upon a political career in the oligarchy that arose to take power5, being related to a number of the individuals involved and keen to take part in the proceedings6 - actions he expected to improve the state of his city. However, he sadly confied in the Seventh Letter that he eventually considered this regime to be so odious as to make the previous one – with which he was hardly enamored – 'seem by comparison something precious as gold'7.
When this government in turn fell by the wayside, Plato once again – although with understandable wariness – considered trying his hand at politics; but it was this new regime which ordered the execution of Socrates8. Thus, Plato for the most part washed his hands of the practice of politics, and turned his mind towards philosophy – but not without continued political concern. For, as he states in his Seventh Letter, he came to understand that all men were misgoverned, stating that 'their laws have got into a state that is almost incurable, except by some extraordinary reform'9 - and it is with this reform in mind, and with the attitudes inculcated by all his experiences as discussed in brief here, that Plato writes The Republic.
Let us move in turn to Augustine now. In this instance, we are gifted with at least two in-depth resources for determining his circumstances and life experiences with reliability, both before and after his conversion to Christianity – his friend Possidius' Sancti Augustini Vita (the Life of St. Augustine), and Augustine's own Confessions. Drawing upon these two works, there is easily a surfeit of details for the purposes of this exposition and comparison, with which we shall deal only in brief.
Born into a province of the Roman Empire in its twilight years10, Augustine nonetheless benefited from a classical education, rich in the study of philosophy and rhetoric11. Finding in these his passion12, he pursued a number of different avenues of philosophical thought, as well as reveling in what licentiousness seemed best to him at any given time13, an attitude he would come to regret after his conversion to Christianity. After his flirtations with Hedonism, Manichaeism and Skepticism, Augustine finally reconciled himself to the Catholicism of his mother. He himself attributes this to the intercession of God in his life in the form of a child's voice14; later commentators, suspicious of the existence, let alone influence of God, would attribute this conversion to the skilled rehotic of the Bishop of Milan, Ambrose15.
In the wake of this conversion, Augustine sold his possessions in North Africe, retaining only his home and converting that into a monastery16. From this position, later as an ordained priest in Hippo Regius (regardless of his own wishes on the matter17), and finally as the Bishop of Hippo, he would prove a prolific writer and determiend preacher – producing sermons, exegesis of scripture, didactic works of non-fiction, along with other works and that with which we are chiefly concerned18 - ever foremost addressing the responsibilities laid upon him by his position19.
It has been noted that Augustine was born into the fading Roman empire, but while Plato wrote his Politeia in part as response to the failures of the past, Augustine wrote his City of God in response to a more present tragedy. In 410 A.D., the Visigoths sacked Rome after a series of sieges20, and this sent a tremor throughout the dying empire. While Augustine may not have been aware of the groundwork he was laying for the future in his City of God21, it was most certainly with both doctrinal affirmation and didactic intentions that Augustine wrote one of his greatest works for the shaken inhabitants of his bishopric and the greater empire.
Having completed our brief survey of the historical and personal contexts of the writing of the texts in question there are, as previously noted, a number of marked similarities – and yet, already an easy method of differentiation occurs to the discerning, by which we can begin identifying these texts as necessarily unique. That is, namely, the unique character that is to be found in the intent of the author of each text. It is by this that we can already perceive the distinction between the two, without reading a single word of either.
For instance – while Plato was chiefly concerned with political matters in writing The Republic, Augustine chiefly was not while writing the City of God. Unlike Plato, who withdrew from politics in body only reluctantly, and never fully in thought, Augustine was only with lament and at the begest of Christian duty seen to participate in political or judicial matters, and himself reflects on how much sweeter life would be, without the interruption of such political necessities22. Briefly delving into the texts themselves, this can be seen especially in their nature and form – where The Republic is relatively straightforward in driving towards is philosophical and political messages, the City of God may well seem meandering, repetitive and confused to one attempting to compare the two as of the same intent23.
As a further example of this, one may consider that Plato never intended to found a religion with his philosophical thought24, nor was he any more observant of the gods than the average Greek of his age (and likely less so), paying them what tributes were necessitated by society, and otherwise spare lip-service25. In clear and obvious contrast, Augustine's City Of God was, at its heart, an affirmation of scripture, an attempt to reinforce the authority of God's truth in the hearts of any number of Romans whose faith wobbled precariously in the wake of defeat. This contrast in the very foundations of their philosophical approach is particularly meaningful to their concept of justice, which we shall treat shortly – prior to that, however, it is worth noting that even Augustine's approach to Plato, through Plotinus, can be considered an extension of this faith-minded attitude, in contrast to Plato's own26; but we shall address this in more detail hereafter, as well.
Plato On Justice
The consideration of the topic of justice within Plato's republic is hardly and alien one to students of political theory, with any number of books and articles addressing the topic, if not particularly focused thereupon – indeed, as one notes, the traditionally attributed subtitle of The Republic itself is 'On Justice'27. Commentators and political theorists have, depending on their own bias and agenda, attributed to Plato certain intentions, and derived different conclusions from The Republic. We shall here try to represent – since a truly unbiased portrayal is impossible – at least a balanced one.
Before proceeding any further, it is important to note that anything resembling political science – by which we mean the empirical method so earnestly-striven after in modern times – is not to be found in The Republic, nor is an analysis of legal code or rights28. Rather, justice is presented to us in multiple forms throughout the dialogues composing the text – from Cephalus hearkening to tradition and pious reflection upon the gods, and Polemarchus' proposition of 'giving to each his due', to Thrasymachus' assertion of 'for the benefit of the strong', each is considered by Plato's Socrates, discussed, and eventually discarded as inadequate29. That justice found in laws born of compromise (as proposed by Glaucon and Adiemantus) is, like all the others, found wanting, as Plato's Socrates is not content justice as a product of nomos – that is, a thing which exists as the result of human organization. Rather, he will settle for nothing less than a justice which is physis – inherent in nature, a perfect ideal to which one can appeal regardless of human custom or law30.
Up to this point Plato has been content, in a relatively straightforward manner, to inform as to what justice is not. In just such a straightforward manner, and having identified the three cardinal virtues which he supposes lead us towards justice (wisdom, courage and temperance)31, we are presented with a feginition of justice, in book four of The Republic. To paraphrase it from the original dialogue:
Justice is each man minding his own business.32
Justice, in Plato's idealized republic, is each man minding to his own affairs, staying within the realm of those affairs which are the proper concern of his class, and abstaining from interfering in the affairs of any other man – and most certainly, of an individual of some other class33. Whether this serves us as a definition of justice, especially in the absence of the idealized republic Plato proposes, is a subject for debate, with some considering that there is still a certain principle which can be distilled from this and applied to our own society, whatsoever that should be34; others revile it as supporting social stratification and the unquestioned domination of the ruling class35 – accusations which are almost certainly true, although in Plato not attached to any malign intent.
Regardless of the attitude towards this definition, however, it is a reasonable approximation of Plato's view on this concept with The Republic, and so we shall move forward with it as we prepare to compare it against Augustine's own.
Augustine the Neo-Platonist
Before we proceed to discuss Augustine's conception of justice, however, it is worth noting yet another level of disconnect between Plato and Augustine. Plato's influence on Augustine is attested to by later commentators and critics, many noted philosophers and theorists themselves. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, commented on the deep debt that Augustine's thought owed to Plato, claiming that wherever Augustine did not wholesale adopt Platonism into Christianity, he at least adapted it to fit36. The problem with this view is that it fails to take into account that Augustine cannot be considered to have come into contact with Plato and his philosophy directly. Instead, he was informed by the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus37, a Platonism which had lost much of its original character. Already it had taken on a more spiritual aspect, and had been adapted not only to fit the Greek pantheon by Proclus38, but also 'peopled with Christian and Biblical figures' by Origen39 some two hundred years before Augustine's birth40.
It was this Platonism, already transitioning into theology, with which Augustine was familiar, and so it is that we must consider Augustine, at best, to have benefited from a trickle-down version of Plato, percolated through the minds of many others. This is not to say that the philosophy with which he was familiar was in some way inferior to a more direct experience of Plato, as some have suggested41 – rather, it is to point out yet another area in which Plato and Augustine can hardly be considered to overlap. In applying some aspects of Platonism to Christianity, Augustine was only continuing a trend and applying a philosophy which had begun, in his experience, with Plotinus, and not Plato.
Augustine and God's Justice
To discern Augustine's concept of justice, even when considering only the City Of God, is a more difficult task than in The Republic, as nowhere is there given us a singular, clearly stated definition – or if there is, there are a multiplicity of them42. Moreover, rather than proposing some system by which justice might be understood and implemented here on Earth, Augustine considers that the political system – derived as it is from “bands of robbers” which became nations in the fullness of time43 – needs inevitably to perish with the sinful nature from which it sprung, and so no real justice can be found therein44. The final difficulty lies in the form of the text of the City of God, as previously mentioned. It is not a well-ordered, systematic approach to some topic of metaphysics or political theory that drives his writing, but rather a discussion which rotates around, and often returns to, God45. Thus we can see at once that justice necessarily derives from God, but little else.
To begin with, then, we must define the outline of this justice, its nature. By examining the City of God, we can arrive at some conclusions. One, that this justice is not of the nature that it should be composed of single acts of outward justice, but requires a transformation of the man involved, such that God's justice is in him and works through him46. Nor are the laws of the antions to which any member of the City of God (the church, whether physical or, more likely, the spiritual church-nation which Augustine envisioned) considered to be of any particular import, or contribute to the laws of this new kingdom47, aiming only at the maintenance of earthly peace. Certainly, Augustine invests only little faith in the earthly laws, and rulings based upon them – even those made by other bishops, of whome many were found wanting in this, amongst numerous other areas48.
That is not to say that there is no longer law in the City of God – rather, Augustine recognizes the law of scripture, and that which is derived from and ruled over by God49. It is required that man put himself in submission to this law, in order to be in the peace and intended order of the individual, and to therefore have justice within himself – and it is a necessity that each man possess such justice within himself for it to exist in the community50.
Justice is found in many forms, under many guises in the City of God – as peace, and as order, and justice itself, and finally as love (which we shall further discuss shortly), always emanating from God as its originator and guarantor51. Examining book 19 in particular, we can finally arrive at a definition of the nature of this justice: that which is found under the rule of God, of an obedient people bound into community by a common love of Him52, where the individual rationally rules over the irrational vices of the flesh53, under a system of law where a hierarchical and family-like rule is observed54, and love of God and one's neighbour is necessitated thereby55.56 Without question, Augustine's definition is a somewhat more involved one than that proposed by Plato.
Justice Within and Without the City
Having finally arrived at some acceptable definition of justice as derived from The Republic and from the City of God, it now befalls us to weigh the two against one another – a task refreshingly clear-cut compared to that which faced us in determining the objects of our comparison. For this purpose, it is reasonable to consider not just the definitions themselves, but also their intended context – that is, the city in which we would find them.
Plato's republic would operate within a stratified, class-bound system57, under the assumption of a noble lie, a lie of religion and rightful rule and metal in the blood, a bokononism. Within this system, justice would be found in each man minding his own business, allowing the 'ruler to rule, the worker to work – the slave to slave'58.
Of course, the implementation and operation of this justice is arguable, and outside the scope of this paper – but its essential character is clear. Plato cannot help but be interpreted as one who, suspicious of the existence and intentions of any god or gods, nonetheless encourages a religion of falsehood to maintain social order as an aspect of his justice. More could be said on this59, but having achieved our aim in describing justice in the context of Plato's idealized republic, we shall leave further investigations to the reader.
We can now describe justice in the City of God by contrast. While Augustine espouses hierarchical rule, he never sets out to establish classes which have some specific attribute of rule attached thereto. While he shares with Plato the assertion that the ruler should not desire to rule for the love of power60, he does not require that the rulers be deceived for them to rule well, and not in their own interests61. While he admits that disorder exists and that human nature is naturally sinful, he believes in a natural, higher standard to which humans can be called, and influencing factor to ensure individual and societal order without deceit.
This, then, brings us to the ultimate distinction between the concepts of justice within The Republic and the City of God – namely, the assumed existence and love of God. God's love is assumed in the City of God, and its transformational power is understood to be at work in those who would rule as agents of this city. Throughout Augustine is found this assumption of a higher nature bestowed upon humanity through the influence of this love, and so the precautions – the lies – with which Plato hedges the good behaviour of individuals within his republic become unnecessary; and where Plato was forced to rely upon a philosopher-king who had glimpsed the eternal forms to rule wisely, Augustine relies upon the originator of all good things, eternal and temporal, and in this has a truer assurance and ethically superior guarantor of justice. Plato considered god a noble lie – Augustine, a transformative truth.
Conclusion
While there is certainly more that could be said on this subject, it is safe to conclude, given the previously offered evidence, that Augustine can hardly be considered the plagiarist of Plato that he is often accused of being. To summarize: the unique circumstances of each lead to very different intents in their writings; the distance of time and the involvement of other minds between Plato and Augustine means the philosophy which they apply is not at all a one to one correspondence; and finally, their very difference conceptions of justice within the context of their works (and the cities imagined therein) all lead one to conclude that the understanding one comes away with from each is inarguably unique.
Bibliography
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Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911 ed., s. v. “Pericles(490-429 B.C.)”.
Plato. Seventh Letter. Tr. Harward, J. Http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/seventh_letter.html. Accessed 18/11/09.
Catholic Encyclopedia, 1913 ed., s. v. “Thagaste”.
Augustine of Hippo. Confessions. Tr. Edward Pusey. (Project Gutenberg, 2002).
Encyclopedia Americana, 1997 ed. s. v. “Augustine”.
Weiskotten, Herbert T. The Life of Saint Augustine: A Translation of the Sancti Augustini Vita by Possidius, Bishop of Calama. (New Jersey: Evolution Publishing, 2008).
Heather, Peter. The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History. (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Augustine of Hippo. City of God. Tr. Marcus Dods. (New York: The Modern Library, a division of Random House Inc., 1950).
Kuznicki, Jason. Open Society VI: On Religion as a Noble Lie. (Positive Liberty: http://www.positiveliberty.com/2007/07/open-society-vi-on-religion-as-a-noble-lie.html). Accessed 19/11/09.
Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966).
Roberts, Peri and Peter Sutch. An Introduction to Political Thought: Key Concepts and Thinkers. (New York: New York University Press, 2004).
Plato. The Republic. Tr. B. Jowett. (Project Gutenberg, 2008).
Raphael, D. Concepts of Justice. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae.
Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy. (New York: Random Hous Inc., 1962).
Rainy, Robert. The Ancient Catholic Church From The Accession of Trajan to the Fourth General Council. (Online: Boucher Press, 2008).
O'Daly, Gerard. Augustine's City Of God: a reader's guide. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Uhalde, Kevin. Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine. (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).
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1Jaspers, Karl. Plato and Augustine. ed. Hannan Arendt. Tr. Ralph Manheim. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 4.
2Ibid, 5.
3Ibid, 4.
4Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911 ed., s. v. “Pericles(490-429 B.C.)”.
5Plato. Seventh Letter. Tr. Harward, J. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/seventh_letter. Accessed 18/11/09.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Specifically, in Thagaste of Numidia, which is modern-day Souk-Ahras of Algeria, in the year 354 A.D. Catholic Encyclopedia, 1913 ed., s. v. “Thagaste”.
11Jaspers, 65.
12Ibid.
13For instance, his time spent with the euersores, and their encouragement of extra-marital couplings. Augustine of Hippo. Confessions, Book 3 Paragraph 3.
14Augustine, Book 8 Paragraphs 28 and 29.
15Jaspers, 65.
16Encyclopedia Americana, 1997 ed. s. v. “Augustine”.
17Jaspers, 65. Jaspers simply makes a note that this ordainment by the Bishop Valerius was “against his [Augustine's] will”.
18Jaspers, 66.
19Weiskotten, Herbert T. The Life of Saint Augustine: A Translation of the Sancti Augustini Vita by Possidius, Bishop of Calama. (New Jersey: Evolution Publishing, 2008), 40.
20Heather, Peter. The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 227-229.
21Jaspers, for instance, asserts that Augustine lacked the foresight necessary to consider his text a foundation for any future eras, and thought only of the present in composing his work.
22Augustine of Hippo. City of God. Tr. Marcus Dods. (New York: The Modern Library, a division of Random House, Inc., 1950). Book 19, Chapter 19.
23Jaspers, 65. “... Augustine's works are like mine. The jewels and veins of gold are embedded in great masses of barren rock. It is in the midst of endless repetitions, interminable streams of rhetoric, that we find the succinct, self-contained, classical pieces.”
24Jaspers, 63.
25This is debatable, of course – some would see Plato's concept of God expressed in his Timaeus, in book 10 of The Laws, and perhaps in places in The Republic – but arguing solely from The Republic, one would find, in his emphasis on a noble lie of religion that would help enforce the structure of his ideal republic, that he has little respect for the structure and reality of god(s) or religion, if not the abstract conception of a god or gods, which he typically uses illustratively or to reinforce a point. See also: Kuznicki, Jason. Open Society VI: On Religion as a Noble Lie. Positive Liberty: (http://www.positiveliberty.com/2007/07/open-society-vi-on-religion-as-a-noble-lie.html). Accessed 19/11/09. Kuznicki also references Karl Popper at length, who shall be referenced later in this text.
26Jaspers, 63.
27Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies: The spell of Plato. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), 89.
28Roberts, Peri and Peter Sutch. An Introduction to Political Thought: Key Concepts and Thinkers. (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 27.
29Ibid, 27-29.
30Ibid, 30-31.
31Plato. The Republic. Tr. B. Jowett. (Project Gutenburg, 2008). Book IV, 975.
32Plato, Book IV, 982. “Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him”.
33Popper, 90.
34Raphael, D. Concepts of Justice. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 42. Here, Raphael proposes that this principle can be applied in terms of social discipline.
35Popper, 90-91.
36Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. I, 84, 5. Tr. Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy. (New York: Random House Inc., 1962), 5. “Whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their writings anything consistent with the faith, he adopted it; and whatever he found contrary to the faith, he amended.”
37Jaspers, 63.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Rainy, Robert. The Ancient Catholic Church From The Accession of Trajan To The Fourth General Council. (Online: Boucher Press, 2008), 168-169.
41Jaspers, 63, 64.
42Maurer, 16.
43O'Daly, Gerard. Augustine's City of God: a reader's guide. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 89-90.
44Jaspers, 101.
45Maurer, 16.
46Augustine, Book 19, Chapter 14. “But, owing to the liability of the human mind to fall into mistakes, this very pursuit of knowledge may be a snare to him unless he has a divine Master, whom he may obey without misgiving, and who may at the same time give him such help as to preserve his own freedom. And because, so long as he is in this mortal body, he is a stranger to God, he walks by faith, not by sight; and he therefore refers all peace, bodily or spiritual or both, to that peace which mortal man has with the immortal God, so that he exhibits the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law.”
47Augustine, Book 19, Chapter 17. “ ... not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the end end”.
48Uhalde, Kevin. Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine. (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 44.
49O'Daly, 211.
50Augustine, Book 19, Chapter 21. “And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises a right control over the body; and in the soul itself the reason must be subject to God if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices. Hence, when a man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him, since in this case his soul cannot exercise a just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices? And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in a community composed of such persons.”
51Maurer, 17.
52Bauer, Susan. The well-educated mind: a guide to the classical education you never had. (New York: Norton & Company Inc., 2003), 208.
53Augustine, Book 19, Chapter 14. “But, as man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has in common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intellect may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which constitutes, as we have said, the peace of the rational soul.”
54Augustine, Book 19, Chapter 16. “Since, then, the house ought to be the beginning or element of the city, and every beginning bears reference to some end of its own kind, and every element to the integrity of the whole of which it is an element, it follows plainly enough that domestic peace has a relation to civic peace, – in other words, that the well-ordered concord of domestic obedience and domestic rule has a relation to the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and civic rule.”
55Augustine, Book 19, Chapter 14. “But as this divine Master inculcates two precepts, – the love of God and the love of our neighbour, – and as in these precepts a man finds three things he has to love, – God, himself and his neighbour ...”.
56O'Daly, 208. A similar definition is given here, although with the intention of proving the existence of Scipio's republic, under the modifications insisted upon by Augustine.
57Popper, 90.
58Ibid.
59See Popper, for instance, and also Leo Strauss' The City and Man, amongst others. Note also Shadia Drury's criticism of the acceptance of this stance in Leo Strauss' writings, the two when taken together providing a more balanced treatment of the subject.
60Augustine, Book 19, Chapter 14. “... for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to others – not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy.”
61Plato, “How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke – just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?”